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Abstract
The 1982 resource amendment to the Constitution, section 92A, purports to alter the balance of federal-
provincial legislative powers in relation to natural resources. Section 92A was enacted into the Constitution
largely as a result of the federal-provincial resource conflicts of the 1970's and early 1980's; conflicts in which
the chief antagonists were the federal government and the governments of the Western provinces. In this
article, the authors discuss the development of section 92A from its roots in the conflicts of the 1970's, and
explore section 92A's possible legal, political and economic effects on the inter-governmental framework for
managing Canadian resources and on the resolution of any future federal-provincial conflicts over resources.
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THE RESOURCE AMENDMENT (SECTION
92A) AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
CANADIAN FEDERALISM
BY ROBERT D. CAIRNS*, MARSHA A. CHANDLER**,
WILLIAM D. MOULL***
The 1982 resource amendment to the Constitution, section 92A, purports to al-
ter the balance of federal-provincial legislative powers in relation to natural
resources. Section 92A was enacted into the Constitution largely as a result of
the federal-provincial resource conflicts of the 1970's and early 1980's; conflicts
in which the chief antagonists were the federal government and the governments
of the Western provinces. In this article, the authors discuss the development of
section 92A from its roots in the conflicts of the 1970's, and explore section
92A's possible legal, political and economic effects on the inter-governmental
framework for managing Canadian resources and on the resolution of any fu-
ture federal-provincial conflicts over resources.
In the last decade, natural resource policy, especially in relation to
energy, has been one of the major issues confronting Canada. Much of
the conflict can be explained by the interweaving of resource policy and
Canadian federalism. Resource policies have generated disputes among
governments and across regions." Constitutional considerations have,
in turn, created conflict in resource policy-making. All of these conflicts
centred on the power to control and manage resource development and
the inter-governmental allocation of resource revenues.
Section 92A, the resource amendment to the Constitution Act,
1867, came into force on April 17, 1982. It was the only element of the
constitutional patriation package that directly altered the balance of
federal-provincial legislative powers.2 The objective of this paper is to
examine the impact of this constitutional amendment on Canadian fed-
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eralism. In particular, how does the altered legal framework affect the
political and economic forces that shape the Canadian federal system?
For this exploration of the connections between Canada's legal
structure and its political economy, the paper is divided into three
parts. The first examines the conflicts that have dominated Canadian
resource politics and the ways in which these conflicts have been man-
aged. The second part focuses on the legal effects of section 92A, con-
centrating on the changes that seem to result in the respective powers
of the federal and provincial governments and in the areas in which
scope for federal-provincial conflict remains despite - or even because
of - its changes in the formal distribution of legislative powers. The
final part considers section 92A as part of a framework within which
Canadians will manage their natural resources and examines a number
of related issues. For instance, how will this change bear on the inter-
governmental conflicts that constitute resource politics? What gains
have been realized by the West, the region that sought the amend-
ment? What are the implications of this section for federal resource
policy-making? And what issues have been left unresolved?
I. RESOURCE POLITICS
For much of Canada's post-war history, resource politics was an
area in which sporadic disputes between governments or between indus-
try and government punctuated a relatively placid sphere of public pol-
icy.3 However, following the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 and the Ira-
nian revolution in 1979, disputes over the management of revenues
from energy resources tested the internal strength of Canadian
federalism. 4
A. Traditional Resource Politics
After the Leduc find in the 1940s and the general expansion of the
Canadian oil and gas industry, resource politics continued in the tradi-
tion that had existed since Confederation. Provincial proprietary pow-
ers over oil and gas and federal powers over trade and commerce were
exercised to benefit the industry. Governments stimulated private activ-
3 For a description of the early phases of energy policy see, e.g., I. McDougall, Fuels and the
National Policy (1982). For mineral policy, see W. MacDonald, Constitutional Change and the
Mining Industry (1980) and D. Patton, "The Evolution of Canadian Federal Mineral Policies" in
C. Beigie & A. Hero, eds. Natural Resources in U.S.-Canadian Relations (1979) at 203.
4 See K. Norrie, "Energy, Canadian Federalism and the West" (1984) 14 Publius 79 and R.
Simeon, "Natural Resource Revenues and Canadian Federalism: A Survey of Issues" (1980) 6
Cdn. Pub. PoL 182.
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ity by offering tax incentives and direct subsidies, as well as by imple-
menting the necessary infrastructure and ancillary services.
Resources have been viewed as levers to growth in two ways. In
the first place, resources themselves are a means of providing employ-
ment and development - both directly, in the resource sector of the
local economy, and indirectly, through linkages to other sectors. Sec-
ondly, resources provide revenue to government. Stevenson contends
that the inclusion of section 109 (which provides for provincial Crown
ownership of natural resources) in the part of the Constitution Act,
1867 on "Revenues; Debts; Assets; Taxation" was intended mainly as a
means of insuring revenues to the provincial governments. Stevenson
suggests, however, that the real significance of section 109 has become
its use as a means of promoting provincial industrialization and eco-
nomic diversification. 5
Historically, however, the second lever has had limited applicabil-
ity. Provincial ownership of resources meant that Crown resources were
a potential source of revenue. Although the provinces guarded this
source of revenue against possible federal incursions, sole reliance upon
it to meet provincial needs was insufficient. This changed after the dra-
matic increases in the world price of oil in 1973 when large economic
rents were created. Until that time, the private sector retained most of
the revenue generated by resource development." In fact, under fed-
eral and provincial tax systems, the resource industries were treated
more favourably than other sectors of the economy.7
Development was pursued, historically, by attempting to work the
first lever. To the extent that they were explicitly formulated, resource
policies were best described as localized and narrow. They were based
on a symbiotic relationship between federal and provincial governments
and producer interests, and upon the geographically localized distribu-
tion of resources within Canada. In fact, the drawing of Canada's na-
tional and provincial boundaries largely reflected this distribution of
the resource endowment.
The differences in resource endowment have meant that provincial
or regional interests have always been diverse, but have not necessarily
been conflicting. Indeed, provincial interests have been broadly compa-
rable due to the role of natural resources as levers of growth. The di-
5 G. Stevenson, "The Process of Making Mineral Policy in Canada" in Beigie & Hero,
supra note 3, at 167.
' Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, Canadian Energy Prospects (J. Da-
vis: Special Study No. 13) (1957).
7 See Statistics Canada, 61-208, 1966.
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versity has usually meant that the federal government could participate
in resource policies aimed at fostering development, without creating
regional tension.
One important reason for the coincidence of regional interest in
natural resource policy has been that Canadian natural resource prod-
ucts have usually been destined for export rather than domestic mar-
kets. Regional development goals respecting the use of resources have
simply not often conflicted. As a result, the division of jurisdiction over
resources between federal and provincial governments was not a source
of dispute. The problem of separating provincial powers over property
and federal powers to interfere with that property seldom came before
the courts.8
There has been one important exception to the observation that
most Canadian resource products were exported. Following the recom-
mendations of the Borden Royal Commission on Energy, the federal
government in 1961 created the National Oil Policy. This policy en-
couraged the development of the western Canadian oil industry by ex-
panding exports to the United States and by creating a protected do-
mestic market west of the Ottawa River Valley. As part of the policy,
Ontario consumers paid a premium for oil of about twenty-seven cents
per barrel over the world price. The successful implementation of this
policy illustrates that the federal government could offset regional dif-
ferences in interest that may have previously existed in federal resource
policies, by balancing those interests politically over time.
To summarize, before the 1970s, the management and control of
the resource industries, including petroleum, produced little conflict as
there was a shared objective among private producers, the provincial
governments and the federal government to encourage exploitation of
resources through private exploration and development.9 Both levels of
government were willing to forego revenues from the industry in order
to foster the growth of this strategically important sector.
B. Resource Politics After 1973
The 1970s saw the transformation of resource politics. Rising eco-
nomic rents and increased perceptions of the importance of energy as
an industrial input led to conflicts between Ottawa and the govern-
ments of the western oil-and-gas producing provinces and between the
8 See D. Thring, "Alberta, Oil and the Constitution" (1979) Alta. L. Rev. 69 at 70.
9 See A. Lucas & I. McDougall, "Petroleum and Natural Gas and Constitutional Change"
in S.M. Beck & I. Bernier, ed., Canada and the New Constitution (1983) vol. II, 21 at 27 and
Stevenson, supra note 5.
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western provinces and Ontario (which, with Quebec, accounted for
sixty per cent of Canadian oil and gas consumption). Much of Cana-
dian resource politics of the late 1970s and 1980s can be viewed as the
interplay of these two highly related cleavages.
Although cracks had begun to appear early in the 1970s, the sud-
denness of the large increases in world prices in 1973 and 1979, and
the resulting sharp changes in world supply patterns, widened the dif-
ferences to rifts. What have come to be known as the first two oil price
"shocks" resulted in great uncertainty and a groping for a reconcilia-
tion that would address two major economic issues.
The first issue was availability. At a time of mounting fears of the
"de-industrialization" of Canada, security of supply at an advanta-
geous price was vital both to protecting the existing industrialized re-
gion of Central Canada and to promoting economic development in the
West. Secondly, the price increases created a massive transfer of
wealth in a relatively short period of time. These two issues led to the
intervention of more actors in the resource policy-making process, in-
cluding other regions. For the first time, interests besides those of the
producers sought representation and accommodation. As a result, the
political process faced a far more difficult task of balancing various
interests.
The heightened conflict caused by the presence of non-producer
interests was not unique to Canada."' What was unique was the ex-
tent to which the conflict emerged as a regional clash. In other federal
systems in which natural resources are concentrated in one region, such
as Australia, the national government has greater control of resources.
In Canada, however, the provincial governments, through their proprie-
tary rights, have long had extensive powers to control the exploitation
of natural resources and to capture resource revenues.
Since Confederation, different patterns of economic development
have emerged across Canada. In effect, during the 1970s Canada had
an economy that was a microcosm of the world economy. The Cana-
dian economy consisted of an industrialized region (in central Canada)
whose dependance on exterior sources of resources, and in particular on
energy, was exposed; an oil-and-gas-rich region (in the West), ambi-
tious to utilize its energy as a springboard to economic development;
and a non-industrialized, resource-poor region (in the Atlantic prov-
inces), lagging in its development. In parallel with developments in the
larger world, resource politics in Canada became an inter-regional
10 See, for example, Lindberg, ed., The Energy Syndrome (1978) at ch. 9.
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issue.
To the industrialized region, as to the industrialized regions of the
rest of the world, oil was a crucial input into the economy. Its availabil-
ity was critical. Availability at a low price was of key importance to
maintaining competitiveness at a time of energy-price-induced "stagfla-
tion". To the producing provinces, on the other hand, as to the produc-
ing regions of the rest of the world, oil and gas were viewed as scarce,
non-renewable, depleting economic assets. The producing provinces
sought to maximize their revenues in order to help prepare for a future
in which their economies could no longer rely on the income generated
from oil and gas. For example, the Alberta and Saskatchewan Heritage
Funds explicitly set aside a portion of current revenues for future pur-
poses. Lower taxes and other benefits made possible by its resources
revenue were an important part of Alberta's attempt to attract industry
into that province. The producing provinces also looked upon oil and
gas as inputs. They saw its availability, at preferential prices, within
the producing provinces as a means of attracting and building an indus-
trial base. The non-industrialized, resource-poor region, as did similar
regions in the rest of the world, became more dependant on external
sources of funds to aid its development and to help maintain its stan-
dard of living.
In the world economy, the conflicts among these interests have not
yet been resolved. In the Canadian federal political process, too, the
differences were too great and too contradictory to be worked out in the
short time frame that was demanded. Rather, the clear differences
manifested themselves in a federal government in which the producing
interests were not effectively represented. As a result, the political bal-
ancing was done primarily between the governments of the producing
provinces, relying on their ownership prerogatives, and the federal gov-
ernment, which was viewed as representing the interests of the industri-
alized and poor regions.
Balancing the interests of even these two regions was a difficult
task for the federal government. The major existing programme for
dealing with regional inequality, the equalization system, exacerbated
the regional disparities created by the concentration of resource reve-
nues."' The equalization programme was not based on direct transfers
among provinces; rather, the provinces' revenues generate obligations
that are funded out of -the federal treasury. The skewed resource rents
meant that virtually every province fell behind Alberta and thus
" See T. Courchene & J. Melvin, "Energy Revenues Consequences for the Rest of Canada"
(1980) 6 Cdn. Pub. PoL 192.
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presented the federal government with a continuing imbalance in pro-
vincial fiscal capacity. But when resource revenues and equalization
payments were tallied against contributions to the federal treasury, the
peculiarities of the formula made Ontario the net loser. Ontario ac-
counted for some forty per cent of the funds that went to compensate
the "have-not" provinces for their low level of resource revenues.12
Although regional interests were the basis for most of the disputes,
much of the conflict over natural resources was drawn along federal-
provincial lines.' 3 Its fiscal responsibilities and its general responsibil-
ity for the macroeconomic matters of inflation and unemployment led
the federal government to seek a greater share of resource revenues and
a greater say in energy management. Although the federal government,
through federally owned Petro-Canada and through its control of re-
sources outside the ten provinces, functioned as a producer-owner as
well as a regulator, it was often seen by the western producing region
as a champion of the interests of eastern energy consumers. Federal
pricing policies of the 1970s were interpreted by the West as responses
to the needs of Central Canadian consumers. The Liberals' energy plat-
form for the 1980 election was a direct appeal to Central Canadian
voters. The Western provinces also took issue with the Oil Export Tax
levied in October 1973, arguing that not only did it impinge on provin-
cial property, but also that other resources such as Central Canadian
hydro did not bear an export tax.1 4 The regional dimensions of Ot-
tawa's battles with the provinces were underscored as Ontario, the
main provincial spokesman for consumer interests, actively supported
the federal resource policies. For example, throughout the 1970s the
Ontario government urged federal pricing restraints and was a strong
supporter of Petro-Canada from its inception in 1975.
The inter-regional differences of interest and the mechanisms of
political negotiation that developed to deal with them showed up in po-
litical and jurisdictional conflict over the aims of policy. The long-
standing joint policy of providing direct encouragement to resource de-
velopment became overshadowed by the particular interests of each
level of government. There were at least three areas in which the inter-
ests of the federal government differed from those of the governments
of the producing provinces, namely, pricing, revenues, and the control
12 See T. Courchene, "Energy and Equalization" in Energy Policies for the 1980s (1980) at
118-20.
12 G.B. Doern & G. Toner, The Politics of Energy (1985).
24 It is to be noted, however, that hydro exports did bear a tax from 1925 to 1963. One also
observes that the Oil Export Tax was first levied at a time of rising oil prices, but was introduced
before the 1973 price "shock".
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of production and distribution.
The Petroleum Administration Act gave Ottawa the power to set
the price of oil in the absence of federal-provincial agreement. The fed-
eral government also unilaterally set the price of oil in Canada under
the National Energy Program in 1980. Charging the world oil price
and thereby following the market, rather than restraining the price at a
lower level, would have favoured the interests of the producing prov-
inces. Two factors, however, argued against charging Canadians the
world price for Canadian oil: (i) the advantage of lower prices would be
lost to industries and consumers in Central Canada; and (ii) a large
share of the rents from the resources would leave the country, expatri-
ated in the guise of dividends to foreign shareholders in the Canadian
oil industry.
Revenues had very different purposes to the two levels of govern-
ment. The producing provinces began to look upon large economic
rents from resources as providing a basis for provincial industrialization
and economic diversity. On the other hand, the federal government
sought increased income from the petroleum industry to increase its
general revenues and, in keeping with its objective of security of supply,
to stimulate exploration for and development of new sources.
New sources of supply were sought mainly on the federally-owned
and controlled Canada Lands. The exploration activities of Petro-Can-
ada, resource incentives such as super-depletion, and the petroeum in-
centives payments ("PIPs") of the National Energy Program (NEP),
were all designed to shift the focus of the oil and gas industry away
from the Western producing provinces. These programs were all costly,
and it was evident that security of supply could have been obtained
more cheaply by encouraging exploration in the producing provinces.
The thrust toward Canadianization in the National Energy Program
may also be viewed in part as an attempt by the federal government to
gain greater control over the petroleum industry. Through its control of
pipelines, as well as the Petroleum Administration Act, Ottawa had
the authority to direct the distribution of energy supplies across Can-
ada. In addition, through the National Energy Board, the export of
energy was under federal control.
By all these means, the federal government sought to ensure secur-
ity of supply to Canadian industry, in the medium term, and to carry
out its other responsibilities (including the funding of its equalization
obligations). The producing provinces, in what they perceived to be a
temporary situation of advantage as owners of a depleting resource,
considered the federal measures to be broad-based threats to their long-
term development as well as to their short-term interests.
[VOL. 23 No. 2
Resource Amendment (Section 92A)
C. Conflict Management
In 1973-74, and later in 1979-80, when rents and control of resource
development assumed a magnified importance, resource conflicts domi-
nated federal-provincial relations. The constitutional division of powers
became more problematic. The traditional and shared policy objective
of encouraging rapid resource exploitation had become supplanted by
inter-governmental conflict. The two vehicles in place for attempting to
reconcile the divergent interests were the political process, in which a
federal-provincial agreement was sought through negotiation, and the
judicial process, in which a third party would impose a decision upon
the political players.
The political bargaining process regarding energy in the 1970s has
often been compared to a zero-sum game, and the continual bickering
between levels of government has been considered by some to be a fail-
ure of federalism. The initial responses of both levels of government to
the two price shocks of 1973 and 1979 were, to be sure, the taking of
short-term non-co-operative threat positions. But then the two levels of
government did turn to discuss their resource differences and to achieve
a grudging accommodation. In 1980, however, the unilateral introduc-
tion of NEP brought that modus operandi to an end. The NEP,
through regulation, subsidies, taxation and public ownership, greatly
expanded the federal government's presence in the resource field. It
was developed without consultation with either industry or with the
provincial governments. Alberta protested such aspects of the NEP as
the regulated price levels and gas export tax by dramatically cutting its
oil production in stages, by holding up approval of oil sands projects
and by challenging federal legislation in the courts. This impasse, very
costly to both sides,1 5 was finally resolved by an energy agreement in
September 1981 between Ottawa and Alberta. Subsequently, the im-
plementation of the NEP was covered by this agreement and modifica-
tions were achieved by later federal-provincial negotiations.
In the 1970s, the courts became a major site for dealing with re-
source disputes. In the context of the political negotiating process, a
reference to the Supreme Court may be viewed as comparable to going
to war. It is essentially a bargaining chip to be played only in excep-
tional circumstances, when co-operation or negotiation appears impossi-
ble or the case seems so clear-cut in one's own favour that negotiation
of the issue is unnesessary. Otherwise, the all-or-nothing type of deci-
" For a discussion of the costs to them and to others, see J. Helliwell & R. McRae, "Resolv-
ing the Energy Conflict: From National Energy Program to the Energy Agreements" (1982) 8
Cdn. Pub. Pol. 14.
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sion to be expected from the judicial process is inimical to co-operation
and will be eschewed by all players. It is significant that, in the major
resource cases where the judicial process was used, proceedings were
initiated by the private sector, outsiders to the political negotiations. 10
In the two leading cases, CIGOL 7  in 1977 and Central Canada
Potash18 in 1978, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down provincial
legislative initiatives aimed at raising greater resource revenues and at
exerting a greater measure of provincial control over resource develop-
ment. In CIGOL, the Supreme Court upheld a challenge to Saskatche-
wan's regime for collecting the economic rent accruing to its oil pro-
ducers after the 1973 oil price shock. The decision was made primarily
on the ground that the regime was a indirect tax which went beyond
the permissible bounds of section 92(2) of the Constitution (which au-
thorizes only direct taxation by a province). In Central Canada Potash,
the Court held that Saskatchewan's potash pro-rationing scheme was,
in essence, directed at the marketing of Saskatchewan potash beyond
the borders of the province. This scheme was therefore an infringement
upon the exclusive federal legislative power in relation to inter-
provincial and international trade and commerce under section 91(2) of
the Constitution.
While Saskatchewan was the defendant province in both cases, the
descisions of the Supreme Court had potentially serious implications
for all the Western resource-producing provinces. Besides their immedi-
ate effect in confining provincial legislative powers in relation to the
taxation and regulation of resources, they appeared to represent a con-
tinued expansion of federal jurisdiction. In particular, the trade and
commerce power was expanded at the expense of provincial legislative
powers and possibly provincial Crown proprietary rights." The
Court's perception of the balance of federal-provincial powers in rela-
tion to resources determined the outcome of both cases despite the fact
that both were initiated by the private sector and that the political ne-
gotiating process had earlier reached some degree of compromise on
the specific issues raised.20
1 After the privately initiated proceedings, however, the federal government did join in the
suits against measures taken by Saskatchewan.
1 Canadian Industrial Gas & Oil Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan, [1978] 2 S.C.R.
545, 80 D.L.R. (3d) 449.
Is Central Canada Potash Co. Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 42, 88
D.L.R. (3d) 609.
19 See S.I. Bushnell, "The Control of Natural Resources through the Trade and Commerce
Power and Proprietary Rights" (1980) 6 Cdn. Pub. Pol. 313.
20 The CIGOL and Central Canada Potash decisions and their aftermath are discussed in
more detail in W.D. Moull, "Natural Resources: The Other Crisis in Canadian Federalism"
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Legal resolution did not always prove to be a satisfactory way to
resolve resource issues. The questions brought before the Supreme
Court were essentially broad political questions that required negotia-
tion and compromise. The court necessarily focused on the particular
case rather than on the broad policy issue, selecting a winner on the
basis of jurisdiction when in fact the conflict was over objectives. The
judicial process, by its very nature, is unable to deal with these thor-
oughly political questions. Although the Court's decisions resolved the
disputes in the most literal sense, in a broader sense they exacerbated
the conflicts to the point that, by the late 1970s, natural resources man-
agement was seen as one of the major sources of tension in the Cana-
dian federal system. Resource policy-making has produced a bitter leg-
acy and has often been quite costly for the participants.21 By the mid-
1970s the western provinces were actively seeking to change the divi-
sion of powers over natural resources. Led by Alberta, the provinces
wanted to strengthen their proprietary rights and to limit Parliament's
jurisdiction over provincial resources. At the Annual Premier's Confer-
ence in Regina in 1978, all ten provinces agreed that constitutional
change must include a confirmation and strengthening of provincial
powers with respect to resources.
D. Changing the Constitution
The changes sought by the producing provinces in resource juris-
diction were framed as part of a general movement to strengthen the
provinces as well as a vehicle for the West to assert greater control over
its own economic development. The drive for change consisted of two
elements. In the first instance, there was unanimous provincial support
for strengthened provincial powers over natural resources. The second
part, which consisted of efforts to limit the resource jurisdiction of the
federal government, did not draw the same unanimity. Not all the
provinces wanted to see federal energy powers constrained.
The interests of the various provinces became more apparent dur-
ing the process of constitutional negotiation. The western producing
provinces sought increased sovereignty and power over their resources.
Alberta was the province most interested in clarifying the rights of
(1980) 18 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
21 See Helliwell & McRae, supra note 15.
22 It is not intended to recreate the detailed constitutional negotiations; they are mentioned
only insofar as they bear on the larger issues. For a participant's picture of the process, see. R.
Romanow, J. Whyte & Leeson, Canada Notwithstanding: The Making of the Constitution 1976-
1982 (1984).
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ownership (over 80 per cent of Alberta's resources are Crown owned)
and in dispelling the limits imposed on its proprietary rights by Parlia-
ment's control over international and interprovincial trade. Alberta
sought to remove these limits by blocking the routes of federal inter-
vention. Saskatchewan, also concerned by the restrictive effect of the
trade and commerce clause, was interested in provincial concurrency in
regulatory jurisdiction and in the right to indirect taxation. British Co-
lumbia was perhaps most concerned with a broader definition of re-
sources and primary production to encompass its products. Newfound-
land shared the Western concern but also wanted section 109 expanded
to include off-shore resources under the provincial Crown. Ontario, a
province long associated with strong provincial powers, recognized Ot-
tawa's ties to consumer interests and, therefore, consistently sought to
counter any reduction in federal energy powers. Quebec sought greater
provincial powers. The Best Effort draft of February 1979 proposed a
shift in the balance between federal and provincial powers with respect
to resources. Provincial powers were to be expanded and a restriction
was to be imposed on federal power over interprovincial trade in
resources.
Under the Best Effort draft proposals, the producing provinces
were to be allowed access to indirect resource taxation powers, so long
as those powers were not used to differentiate between production con-
sumed within the producing province and production exported for use
in other parts of Canada. An extended definition of primary production
was proposed, which would have included refined or processed produc-
tion as well as the raw product itself. While provincial Crown proprie-
tary rights were not to be extended, they would have been expressly
preserved and would have been supplemented by comprehensive and
exclusive legislative powers to regulate resources within the producing
provinces. Furthermore, provincial legislative powers to regulate the ex-
port of resource production would have been conferred for the first
time, both interprovincially and internationally, provided that those
powers were not used to discriminate in prices as against other parts of
Canada. Concurrency for federal legislative jurisdiction, particularly
under the trade and commerce power, would have been preserved. In a
reversal of the usual position, however, the automatic paramountcy of
federal legislation over provincial "export" legislation would have ap-
plied only to international trade and commerce. With respect to inter-
provincial trade in resource production, provincial legislation would
have been paramount over conflicting federal legislation unless Ottawa
could demonstrate that its legislation was necessary to serve "a compel-
ling national interest that is not merely an aggregate of local
[VOL. 23 No. 2
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interests."2 3
When the federal government initially accepted the Best Effort
draft in February 1979, it was in a weak political position and was
looking for ways to shore up support for more sweeping changes to the
Constitution. The resource proposals were expected to gain support
from Saskatchewan and to make the constitutional package more at-
tractive to Alberta. By late 1979, however, the Iranian Revolution initi-
ated the second world oil price shock. Suddenly, in the federal-provin-
cial game, the pay-off set changed. The federal election results of
February 1980, and the resulting return to power of the Liberals, re-
flected the changed nature of the game: once again the poor and indus-
trialized regions were strongly represented in the federal goverment,
and this time the producing region was not represented at all. The un-
certainly of world energy markets and its new position of strength led
the federal government to renounce the results of its earlier co-opera-
tion with the provinces and to try to impose an equilibrum reflective of
its increased bargaining power. Federal support for the Best Effort
draft was withdrawn.
The constitutional patriation proposal put forth by the federal gov-
ernment in 1980, which reflected its resolve in this area, was unaccept-
able to the provinces. Federal-provincial negotiations over a resource
amendment came to a close when the federal government acted unilat-
erally and placed before Parliament a Resolution on the Constitution
that omitted the resource amendment altogether. It is possible that the
excluded resource amendment was seen by the federal government as a
potential bargaining chip, which was something of importance to the
West that might be relatively easy to re-instate if circumstances so
dictated.
In any event, the federal New Democratic Party moved quickly to
re-instate the resource amendment in the constitutional package. The
amendment was significant to an important sector of NDP support -
the western provinces. Also, putting the amendment back in the resolu-
tion demonstrated that the NDP was able to extract changes in the
resolution in return for its support. Before the Special Joint Committee
on the Constitution, it was the federal NDP, rather than the provincial
governments, that carried on the negotiations over the amendment.
When the resolution returned to the House, it contained section 56, an
23 The Best Effort draft proposals are discussed at some length in R. Harrison, "Natural
Resources and the Constitution: Some Recent Developments and Their Implications for the Fu-
ture Regulation of the Resource Industries" (1980) 1 Alta. L. Rev. 1. See also Lucas & McDou-
gall, supra note 9 at 33-35.
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amendment to the British North America Act, 1867 on "non-renewable
natural resources, forestry resources and electrical energy."
Much of the constitutional negotiations over natural resources
came down to the question of which constituencies and interests should
be the relevant ones in the development of Canadian resources. The
forces shaping constitutional change, therefore, go back to the underly-
ing conflicts between governments and regions. 24 These forces, in turn,
are reflected in the shape of section 92A itself.
II. LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS UNDER SECTION 92A
Section 92A represents a re-drawing of the boundaries of federal-
provincial legislative authority in relation to natural resources. Unlike
the 1979 Best Effort draft proposals, however, section 92A does not




In the context of provincial legislative powers to raise revenues
from natural resources and resource production, subsection 92A(4)
does away with the hoary distinction between direct and indirect taxa-
tion that tripped up Saskatchewan in the CIGOL decision. Subsection
92A(4) provides as follows:
(4) In each province, the legislature may make laws in relation to the raising of
money by any mode or system of taxation in respect of
(a) non-renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the province and
the primary production therefrom, and
(b) sites and facilities in the province for the generation of electrical energy
and the production therefrom,
whether or not such production is exported in whole or in part from the prov-
ince, but such laws may not authorize or provide for taxation that differentiates
between production exported to another part of Canada and production not
exported from the province.
A resource-producing province will now have access to indirect taxation
measures in respect of natural resources produced within the province
(including electrical energy production as well as the primary produc-
tion from forestry resources and hydrocarbons, minerals, and other
non-renewable natural resources).2" Direct taxation powers are still
$, See Romanow, Whyte & Leeson, supra note 22.
93 For more detail regarding the differences between section 92A and the Best Effort draft
proposals, see W.D. Moull, "Section 92A of the Constitution Act, 1867" (1983) 61 Cdn. Bar Rev.
715.
28 The definition of "primary" production is set out in the new Sixth Schedule to the Consti-
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available to a producing province, of course. Thus, a provincial legisla-
ture will now have a complete range of choices available in selecting
and designing the taxation regime it considers appropriate for each re-
source produced within the province (a range comparable to that en-
joyed in the past in designing provincial royalty systems for resource
production from Crown lands owned by the province). Saskatchewan,
for example, has already chosen to replace two key pre-92A direct tax
measures27 with indirect tax regimes designed specifically to take ad-
vantage of the new powers conferred by subsection 92A(4) .28
The powers conferred by subsection 92A(4), however, are not
completely unfettered. First, the indirect resource taxation field now
occupied by the producing provinces must be shared with the federal
government, which has always had powers of indirect taxation by virtue
of section 91(3) of the Constitution. There is nothing in subsection
92A(4) that would restrict the pre-existing powers of Parliament to im-
pose indirect taxes29  - or direct taxes, for that mattera" - in rela-
tion to resources and resource production. Indirect resource taxation,
therefore, will now be a field of concurrent, and potentially overlapping,
federal-provincial jurisdiction.
Second, and in contrast with the federal indirect taxation power,
the new provincial power under subsection 92A(4) cannot be used to
levy an "export" tax at the boundaries of the producing province. Al-
though subsection 92A(4) states quite clearly that provincial tax mea-
sures can be imposed whether or not taxed resource production is ex-
tution, which was added by subsection 92A(5). In some instances, like the Best Effort draft propo-
sal, the definition is extended beyond mere raw products. The Sixth Schedule reads as follows:
For the purposes of section 92a of this Act,
(a) production from a non-renewable natural resource is primary production therefrom if
(i) it is in the form in which it exists upon its recovery or severance from its natural state,
or
(ii) it is a product resulting from processing or refining the resource, and is not a manu-
factured product or a product resulting from refining crude oil, refining upgraded heavy
crude oil, refining gases or liquids derived from coal or refining a synthetic equivalent of
crude oil; and
(b) production from a forestry resource is primary production therefrom if it consists of
sawlogs, poles, lumber, wood chips, sawdust or any other primary wood product, or wood
pulp, and is not a product manufactured from wood.
27 The Oil Well Income Tax Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. 0-3.1 (Supp.); The Mineral Taxation Act,
R.S.S. 1978, c. M-17.
28 The Freehold Oil and Gas Production Tax Act, S.S. 1982-83, c. F-22.1; The Mineral
Taxation Act, 1983, S.S. 1983-84, C. M-17.1.
29 Such as the new taxes imposed as part of the National Energy Program: see An Act to
amend the Excise Tax Act and the Excise Act and to provide for a revenue tax in respect of
petroleum and gas, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 68.
o0 Such as the provisions of the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, applicable to in-
come earned from resource production and processing.
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ported in whole or in part from the province, it prohibits differential
taxation as between production exported from the producing province
"to another part of Canada" and production that is not exported from
the province. Moreover, it seems implicit in subsection 92A(4) that a
province also cannot differentiate taxation measures with regard to pro-
duction that is exported from Canada as well as from the province.31
Consequently, a producing province cannot impose what amounts to an
export tax at its boundaries. Examples of this would be taxing only
production that is exported from the province; or taxing that produc-
tion at rates higher than those imposed on local production consumed
or used within the province; or taxing all production equally but coup-
ling the tax measures with some scheme (such as a rebate program)
that favours consumption or use within the province.3 2 In this respect,
the taxation powers of the producing province still cannot be used as an
indirect means of interfering with extra-provincial trade in resource
production.
B. Resource Management Powers
In its provisions relating to resource-management powers, section
92A does confer some new authority on the producing provinces in re-
lation to the entry of resource production into extra-provincial markets.
Subsection 92A(2) provides as follows:
(2) In each province, the legislature may make laws in relation to the export
from the province to another part of Canada of the primary production from
non-renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the province and the
production from facilities in the province for the generation of electrical energy,
but such laws may not authorize or provide for discrimination in prices or in
supplies exported to another part of Canada.
Before section 92A was enacted, as Central Canada Potash exem-
plifies, a producing province had no legislative authority to regulate the
marketing of its resource production beyond its boundaries. Regulation
of interprovincial and international marketing was the exclusive pre-
serve of Parliament under its trade and commerce power in section
31 Because any measure that purported to so differentiate, at least in any substantial respect,
would likely be categorized by the courts as something other than a true "taxation" measure and
thus beyond the permitted bounds of subsection 92A(4). For elaboration on this point, see W.D.
Moull, "Section 92A of the Constitution Act, 1867," supra note 25 at 719 and W.D. Moull,
"Mineral Taxation in Saskatchewan under the New Constitution" in Bartlett ed., Mining Law in
Canada (1984) at 221-31.
32 Provincial "export" taxes, including combined tax-plus-rebate schemes, were struck down
by the courts before section 92A: see Attorney General for British Columbia v. McDonald Mur-
phy Lumber Co. [1930] A.C. 357, [1930] 2 D.L.R. 721 (P.C.), and Texada Mines Ltd. v. Attor-
ney General for British Columbia, [19601 S.C.R. 713, 24 D.L.R. (2d) 81.
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91(2) of the Constitution. Now, the producing provinces have concur-
rent legislative powers in relation to the export of production to other
parts of Canada - but not, it should be noted, in relation to the export
of production from Canada. Unlike the Best Effort draft, section 92A
gives the producing provinces no entry into the regulation of interna-
tional resource marketing.
Within Canada, this new legislative jurisdiction cannot be used in
a discriminatory fashion. The interpretation of the non-discrimination
proviso at the end of subsection 92A(2) is a difficult matter, at least
until addressed by the courts. In contrast with the Best Effort draft
proposal, it applies to "supply" discrimination as well as "price" dis-
crimination. At the very least, it will prevent a producing province from
playing favourites as among consuming provinces - for instance, by
favouring one consuming province or region with lower prices or
greater supplies than are offered to others within Canada but outside
the producing province. It may even be that the proviso will prevent a
producing province from favouring itself over all others in Canada, par-
ticularly with respect to prices charged for local production that is con-
sumed or used locally.
The new provincial "export" jurisdiction under subsection 92A(2)
is concurrent with that of Parliament under its trade and commerce
power (which to that extent can no longer be said to be exclusive). The
paramountcy of all federal legislation over any provincial enactments
under subsection 92A(2), however, is expressly preserved by subsection
92A(3), which reads as follows:
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) derogates from the authority of Parliament to en-
act laws in relation to the matters referred to in that subsection and, where such
a law of Parliament and a law of a province conflict, the law of Parliament
prevails to the extent of the conflict.
This provision was probably unnecessary. The powers conferred by sub-
section 92A(2) are not made "exclusive" to the provinces, so all prior
federal powers - notably the trade and commerce power - would
have been preserved by implication. That being so, in the event of a
direct conflict between federal and provincial measures, traditional the-
ories of federal paramountcy developed by the courts would have re-
quired that the provincial measure yield to the federal measure. Sub-
section 92A(3) simply puts that result beyond any doubt. It also
represents, however, a marked reversal of the position under the Best
Effort draft, which would have allowed for provincial paramountcy in
inter-provincial resource trade in the absence of a compelling national
interest.
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Overall, subsection 92A(2) has, for the first time, given the pro-
ducing provinces legislative jurisdiction in relation to the "export" mar-
keting of their resource production within Canada. Subsection 92A(I),
on the other hand, speaks to the pre-marketing aspects of natural re-
source management within a producing province, particularly in rela-
tion to the development and production of resources. It provides as
follows:
(1) In each province, the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to
(a) exploration for non-renewable natural resources in the province;
(b) development, conservation and management of non-renewable natural re-
sources and forestry resources in the province, including laws in relation to the
rate of primary production therefrom; and
(c) development, conservation and management of sites and facilities in the
province for the generation and production of electrical energy.
Subsection 92A(1) is the most difficult provision in the resource
amendment to assess in terms of its legal impact. In one sense, it may
have changed very little since each of the resource-related activities it
mentions - exploration, development, conservation and management
- were probably within provincial legislative jurisdiction before sec-
tion 92A was enacted. For example, the power to restrict rates of re-
source production for conservation purposes has long been recognized
as a valid provincial objective, for example, even if the conservation
measure might incidentally restrict exports of production from the
province.3 3 But a provincial jurisdiction in respect of each of these
activities, as a matter of general legislative authority, arose inferen-
tially under the pre-1982 Constitution. Before the enactment of section
92A, the only provisions to even mention resources were section 109,
which vests all "Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties" in the Crown
in right of the provinces, and section 92(5) which confers on the prov-
inces legislative authority in relation to the management of these pro-
vincially-owned Crown lands.3' So in another sense, subsection
92A(1) may have changed a great deal because it has now entrenched
in the Constitution, in express terms, a comprehensive list of provincial
resource-related legislative powers that do not depend for their vitality
and application upon provincial Crown ownership of resources.
As a result, provincial resource-management measures need no
longer be concerned with the distinction between Crown-owned and
freehold resources within the province. The powers set out in subsection
I' Spooner Oils Ltd. v. Turner Valley Gas Conservation Board, [1933] S.C.R. 629, [1933] 4
D.L.R. 545.
" By subsection 92A(6), those powers - along with all other pre-existing provincial rights
and powers - are expressly preserved, as was the case under the Best Effort draft proposals.
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92A(1) can be exercised in relation to the whole of a particular re-
source within the province, without regard to what proportions of that
resource are owned by the Crown or by others. In a general sense, then,
the effect of subsection 92A(1) is to confer on the producing provinces
resource-management powers in relation to all resources in the prov-
inces. These powers closely approximate the resource-management
powers that they previously enjoyed in respect of Crown-owned
resources.
There is a catch, however. The powers conferred by subsection
92A(l) can only be used in respect of resources "in the province."
They cannot be used as a tool to affect matters beyond provincial bor-
ders. Incidental effects beyond the province still seem permissible. For
instance, a provincial scheme which restricts the rate of production of a
resource should still be upheld if it has the incidental effect of reducing
exports of the resource from the province. But a provincial scheme that
is found by the courts to be "aimed" at reducing exports, even if its
operative mechanism is a restriction on rates of production (as was the
case in Central Canada Potash), will probably not be categorized by
the courts as falling within any of the heads of resource-management
power in subsection 92A(l). That scheme may be saved by subsection
92A(2), if it is aimed at exports to other parts of Canada, but it will
likely fall beyond the bounds of provincial authority under subsection
92A(1) as an intra-province resource-regulation measure.
III. A NEW PHASE OF RESOURCE POLITICS?
What are the implications of section 92A for the political economy
of Canadian federalism? The answer to this question may first be un-
derstood in terms of its effects on the provinces' ability to make natural
resource policy. Under the new arrangements at least two of the signifi-
cant bases for legal action against the provinces have been removed:
concurrence in interprovincial trade in resources has been created and
provincial taxing powers have been broadened. This does not mean that
conflict is at an end or that provincial actions will go unchallenged by
Ottawa or by the private sector. There are still specific limitations on
the provinces' new authority as well as a number of ambiguities likely
to be taken to the courts for clarification. Future rulings may well sig-
nificantly shape the powers of both levels of government. But the over-
lapping jurisdiction that arises from the new constitutional framework
more accurately reflects the complex competing interests that make re-
source politics.
Since Confederation, natural resources have been viewed as pro-
vincial matters, reflecting the ownership perogatives conferred by sec-
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tion 109. Resentment in Alberta lingers over the waste of resources in
the Turner Valley before 1930, when full provincial rights were re-
ceived by the three prairie provinces. Since the Leduc discovery in
1947, the modern oil and gas industry in Alberta has been very much a
provincial concern. Yet, oil and gas have been considered national is-
sues in Canada since at least the late 1950s, when the (gas) Pipeline
Debate brought down a federal government, and when the Borden
Royal Commission was established. These issues led to the establish-
ment of the National Energy Board in 1959 and the National Oil Pol-
icy in 1961.
The acceptance of section 92A by both the federal and provincial
governments means that we can now view resource politics from an
alternative perspective. During the 1970's, the debates revolved around
centralization and decentralization. Now, both levels of government ex-
plicitly recognize that provincial and national objectives may be both
different and legitimate, and that this duality must be accommodated.
Of course, recognizing that there may be legitimate but competing in-
terests does not make their accommodation easier. The determination
of where provincial interests leave off and national interests prevail re-
mains the persistent question to be resolved. Resource-related issues
may again make their way to the Supreme Court, at least until some of
the interpretive problems in section 92A have been settled judicially.
Subsequently, intergovernmental conflicts are more likely to end up at
the political bargaining table than in the courts.
Section 92A relaxes some of the former legal constraints on the
provincial governments and thereby broadens the set of political options
available to them, without narrowing those available to the federal gov-
ernment. Are the producing provinces mollified by the amendment?
Certainly the West wanted more. Western provincial governments of
various ideological complexions saw resource management as crucial to
their economic development. Unconstrained powers over resource ex-
ploitation, development, marketing and taxation were viewed as funda-
mental to those objectives. Alberta sought far greater restrictions on
federal powers and Saskatchewan considered concurrence in interna-
tional trade with respect to resource exports to be fundamental to any
meaningful constitutional reform. Section 92A did not grant these
changes, but there is no doubt that it did address some of the West's
concerns. The provincial governments under section 92A can now con-
trol the rate of development of resource industies within their borders.
They can have an influence on trade within Canada, and so may have
an influence on the location of activity related to a particular resource.
Most importantly, they can tailor their tax, royalty and regulatory pro-
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grams to their needs, in a consistent manner, without having to be con-
cerned with the distinction between freehold and Crown resources.
The federal government, on the other hand, has retained the power
to ensure the preservation of a Canadian common market. With regard
to natural resources in particular, these concerns are reflected in the
parts of section 92A that prohibit provincial discrimination in prices,
supplies and taxation within Canada. The small cost to the federal pur-
suit of this objective is that the extention of provincial powers under
subsection 92A(2) into the now-concurrent field of interprovincial trade
and commerce means that Parliament must now take the active and
politically visible step of enacting legislation in order to achieve its
objectives.
The amendment, however, does not address all of the federal-pro-
vincial questions that arose in the 1970s with respect to natural re-
sources. Indeed, a number of the current issues in Canadian energy
politics, including foreign ownership, the equalization formula, the divi-
sion of revenues and the role of Crown corporations, seem to be left
aside by section 92A. One of the federal government's bargaining
strengths during the post-1973 period has been its control of Canada
Lands. Wasteful direct and tax expenditures were incurred in order to
encourage development of the Canada Lands. The purpose was to shift
the focus of the oil and gas industry away from the western provinces.
It is not unreasonable to suppose that the Canada Lands will ultimately
become provinces that will obtain proprietary rights to these lands. One
may, therefore, view the federal government as a steward of these re-
sources. The federal government's stewardship of the Canada Lands
has been compromised in the past ten years. There is a clear analogy to
the federal government's control of petroleum development in Alberta's
Turner Valley before 1930. The incentive remains for the federal gov-
ernment to continue to use the resources of the Canada Lands as a
lever in negotiations with the provinces.
This may well be important in the future, as Canada has not re-
turned to the coincidence of federal and provincial goals of the pre-
1973 era. Indeed, this is why the new arrangements, which recognize
the interests of both parties as legitimate, is of such great importance:
the potential for conflict still exists. For example, the existence of sec-
tion 92A in 1973 would not have altered the potential for the types of
tax disputes that ensued immediately after the two oil price shocks of
the 1970s. There has been no agreement on revenue sharing in the new
Constitution, despite the fact that the principle of equalization, one of
the important aspects of revenue sharing, has become enshrined in the
Constitution [Constitution Act, 1982, s. 361. Indeed, the incentive to
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provincial governments to establish Crown corporations in the resource
industries in order to escape the federal income tax remains under the
new Constitution. There has been no measure to counteract the princi-
ple, contained in section 125 of the Constitution Act, 1867, that one
level of government shall not be taxed by the other. In this connection,
however, it should be noted that other rationales to establish Crown
corporations, such as to circumvent restrictions on provincial legislative
capacities in relation to natural resources, have been reduced.
There may yet be recurrences of the historical conundrum of the
roles of the two levels of government in resource development. How-
ever, by increasing the scope of concurrence in the resource sector, sec-
tion 92A sets the stage for more negotiation. The question of whether
there will be more or less conflict in those negotiations cannot be read-
ily determined. Given the interests of the players, conflict at the politi-
cal bargaining table is a function of many factors including the person-
alities of the decision-makers, the ideologies and the public stances of
the governments, as well as the international economy. Section 92A
spells out the powers held by each level but like any formal constitu-
tional provision, it does not determine the way those powers will be
exercised. The amendment provides a revised framework for the man-
agement of conflict that acknowledges the interests of both federal and
provincial governments in resource development.
[VOL. 23 No. 2
